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Can a revenue-neutral corporation tax reform enhance international 
competitiveness?  
 
 
The corporation tax reforms announced in the Budget are intended to “promote 
growth by enhancing international competitiveness, encouraging investment and 
promoting innovation”. The pattern has become familiar in many countries since 
Nigel Lawson’s reforms in 1984: to reduce the tax rate and pay for it by expanding 
the tax base. Overall, the changes are intended to be revenue neutral. 
 
The tax rate is coming down from 30% to 28%. Within Europe, this change moves the 
UK below the Netherlands and Luxembourg – two special cases for corporation tax 
anyway - but leaves the ranking relative to all the other countries unchanged. 
Meanwhile, allowances on plant and machinery will fall from 25% to 20% and 
allowances on industrial buildings are being phased out. There are other, smaller 
changes, including an increase in the R&D tax credit.  
 
Can a tax change which leaves business paying the same overall amount of tax really 
enhance competitiveness? I can think of three possible reasons why the government 
might think so.  
 
One argument says that the real impetus for tax competition is not attracting capital, 
but in attracting profit. Conditional on where economic activity takes place, 
companies are able to shift profits between jurisdictions, subject to the constraints 
imposed by revenue authorities. The incentive to shift profit is based on differences in 
the headline rate, because companies shift taxable profit after using up allowances.  
 
But if this is the tax competition in which the UK is engaged, it has little to do with 
investment and rather more to do with preventing an outflow of taxable profit. How 
that affects tax revenue depends on how sensitive profit flows are. It is certainly 
possible that the UK is on the wrong side of the Laffer curve – that is, that a reduction 
in the rate may actually increase tax revenues. But the government does not appear to 
believe this: it predicts a cost of reducing the tax rate of over £2 billion.  
 
A second argument concerns gainers and losers. If the reform is revenue neutral, then 
there must be losers – businesses which invest heavily in pant and machinery and in 
industrial buildings are obvious candidates. Gainers are likely to be more profitable 
companies. For more profitable companies, tax allowances are smaller relative to 
income and so the reduction in the tax rate is more valuable to more profitable 
companies.  
 
So it is possible that the government seeks to promote more profitable companies over 
less profitable ones. It is also plausible that more profitable companies undertake 
more investment and innovate more. It is also plausible that they are more mobile, and 
likely to shift activities out of the UK to lower-taxed jurisdictions. If that is true, then 
it is just about plausible that the reforms will enhance competitiveness.  
 
Is this really what Gordon Brown has in mind? It seems unlikely that this was the 
driving force for the reforms, but it may have been a factor. Though in any case the 
argument may be offset to the extent that larger, more profitable companies are also 
more able to shift profits between countries.  
 
A final possibility is that the government believes that companies make investment 
and location decisions only on the basis of the headline rate. It is true that the headline 
rate dominates popular discussion. But it seems unlikely that any sensible business 
which allows for taxes in its decisions will simply ignore the measure of income to 
which the 28% is applied.  
 
So the enhancement of international competitiveness resulting from these reforms 
may be something of a mirage.  
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